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Annual health care costs in the United States currently total $1.5 trillion and
are heading into another year of double-digit percentage increases as other
parts of the economy experience falling prices and profit margins. Health
insurers and managed care organizations report sharply higher profits as
premiums rise faster than underlying costs. Costs are passed along to pur-
chasing employers who, in turn, shift the cost increases to workers in the
form of higher deductibles, copayments, and premiums.“The losers are the
patients,”is a common reaction to higher health care costs.
Efforts to control costs include a system of financial incentives that
rewards physicians for limiting medical expenditures. A major concern is
that these cost-control efforts require physicians to sacrifice the quality of
medical care. Price competition, moreover, is expected to result in a “race
to the bottom”in which physicians operate under severe cost controls and
managed care plans offer minimum levels of care. These incentives, which
are inherent in policies and practices that influence physician decision
making, have been the subject of high-stakes litigation and intense public
controversy as the common refrain is again,“The losers are the patients.”
This brief, by David J. Cooper and Research Associate James B. Rebitzer,
considers the interaction between physician incentive systems and product
market competition in the delivery of medical services via managed care
organizations. At the center of the analysis is the process by which health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) assemble physician networks and the
role these networks play in the competition for customers. The authors
propose a model of the managed care marketplace that solves for both
physician incentive contracts and HMO product market strategies in an
environment of extreme information asymmetry: physicians perceive the
quality of care they offer perfectly and their patients do not perceive it at all.Physicians are influenced by norms of medical practice that shape their
attitudes and behavior. These norms also affect the operation of HMOs,
which are constrained by the need to build large networks of physicians for
consumers willing to pay more to ensure adequate physician choice. A key
insight of this brief is that while managed care organizations compete for
patients, they must also compete for physicians, and thus quality competi-
tion becomes important in attracting physicians to a network. The analysis
therefore rests critically on the norms of medical practice prevailing among
physicians.
Cooper and Rebitzer find that although physician practice styles respond to
financial incentives, there is little evidence that HMO cost-containment
incentives cause a discernable reduction in care quality. HMOs include
stop-loss provisions to assure high-quality care and apply cost-containment
pressures on elective medical services. Purchasers are much more respon-
sive to premium levels and the number of physicians in a network than to
assertions regarding quality.
The authors note that important aspects of health care may not be fully
captured in the factors that constrain HMO behavior, such as physician
practice norms, patient preference for choice of physician, and expected
awards for malpractice. Their analysis shows that as a result of strong
norms among physicians about minimal care quality and of patients’pref-
erences for larger HMO networks, there is no “race to the bottom”in care
quality.
An additional finding is that public policies limiting cost-containment
incentives have the twin effects of increasing premiums and the number of
uninsured. The authors therefore recommend that policies regulating
HMO incentive systems should include actions to improve health care
access for the uninsured. There is also a need, they say, for further investi-
gation into the way norms of medical practice shape both physician
behavior and the functioning of markets in the U.S. health care system.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
November 2002
Public Policy Brief 6A New Yorker cartoon from a few years ago shows a group of frightened
young campers huddled around an evening campfire. In the caption the
counselor says,“Very scary,Jennifer—does anyone else have an HMO hor-
ror story?”1 The campers are not alone in their fear of health maintenance
organizations (HMOs). Everywhere in the media, including movies and
television, HMOs are the focus of popular frustration with the U.S. health
care system.
In the current environment, it is hard to remember that HMOs were once
viewed as a force for progress in U.S. medicine. Prior to the HMO revolu-
tion,physicians determined what medical care to deliver and insurers pas-
sively financed whatever procedures or prescriptions physicians ordered.
Neither the patient nor the physician paid directly for these resources, so
neither had the incentive to balance the costs against the expected benefits.
This absence of incentives produced a gold-plated style of medical practice
in which physicians could order costly tests, procedures, and prescriptions
even if they were (from a clinical standpoint) of limited value.
Managed care was supposed to fix this problem.The idea was simple: create
a new entity, a health maintenance organization, that bundled health insur-
ance together with systems for limiting unnecessary medical expenditures.
Consumers (primarily employers who paid insurance premiums for their
staff) would flock to this arrangement because it would offer the promise of
reasonable care at a reasonable price.
The earliest HMOs followed a closed-panel model, i.e., patients who had
insurance from an HMO could see only those physicians who were
employed by that HMO. Since the HMO was capitated (member physi-
cians were paid a fixed fee per patient), this arrangement created built-in
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to the practice of medicine. Later, other types of HMOs appeared that
offered care through networks of physicians. The physicians in these net-
works were typically not employees of the HMO; rather they had inde-
pendent practices and were reimbursed by the HMO for care delivered to
its members according to contractually agreed terms. The ability of these
new network HMOs to tap into independently employed physicians
enabled them to offer patients a much broader range of physician choice
than was possible under the old closed-panel model. Cost-conscious med-
ical practice was encouraged through sophisticated financial and nonfinan-
cial control systems as well as incentives built into physician contracts.2
As new technological innovations made health care both more effective and
more costly, the systems that managed care organizations used to control
expenditures were increasingly seen as schemes that profited  insurers by
degrading care quality. The common HMO practice of offering financial
rewards to physicians who reduced medical expenditures reinforced public
skepticism. Much of the disquiet about managed care has its roots in ques-
tions concerning the effects of incentive systems on physician behavior.
In this policy brief,we discuss physician incentive systems in managed care
organizations. We focus our attention on three questions.
Do financial incentives influence physicians’ medical decision making? 
What effect do HMO incentive systems have on the quality of medical care?
Will competition among HMOs lead to a “race to the bottom” in the qual-
ity of medical care? If so,can this race be averted by public policy initiatives?
In a time when Federal Reserve President Alan Greenspan worries about
corporate cultures blighted by “infectious greed,” it is worth emphasizing
that the answer to the first question is not self-evident.Physicians are highly
trained professionals, most of whom are intensely concerned with the wel-
fare of their patients. In addition, the legal system imposes substantial costs
on physicians who are shown to be negligent in the provision of medical
services.This combination of intrinsic motivation and legal sanctions would
seem to leave little scope for the influence of incentive systems.Nevertheless,
studies conducted in a variety of settings indicate that physicians do respond
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contain costs move physicians to adopt more cost-conscious styles of med-
ical practice. (Gaynor, Rebitzer, and Taylor 2001; Barro and Beaulieu 2000;
Kessler and McClellan 1996).
Given the influence of financial incentives on physicians’ behavior, it is
important to consider what effect HMO incentive systems may have on the
quality of medical care.A small but growing body of econometric evidence
(presented below) indicates that while HMO contracts shift surplus dollars
from physicians to insurers,these contracts have little impact on measured
medical outcomes.As we discuss below,the absence of a measurable HMO
effect on quality should not be taken as the last word on the clinical con-
sequences of managed care. The quality of medical care is notoriously dif-
ficult to measure, even for experts. It is quite plausible that HMOs and
their incentive systems are degrading care quality along dimensions that
are hard to observe or quantify. More important, even if we accept at face
value the claim that HMOs do not currently degrade care outcomes, the
difficulty of observing care quality raises questions about the eventual
impact of managed care.
Understanding the effect of HMOs on the eventual level of care requires an
appropriate model of the competitive environment in which HMOs oper-
ate. Suppose, for example, that HMOs attempt to reduce premiums at the
expense of care quality by giving physicians very generous financial
rewards for containing costs. In a typical economic setting, consumers
would perceive such a decline in the quality of services and would “vote
with their feet” by choosing another insurer and physician if quality fell
below acceptable levels. Put differently, if health care were like other ser-
vices,we might justifiably conclude that market forces would constrain the
equilibrium level of quality from falling too far.
Health care is not, of course, like other services because patients cannot
easily perceive the quality of care they are receiving. Taking this feature
into account may overturn our confidence in the ability of markets to sus-
tain care quality. An HMO that reduced premiums by ratcheting up its
physician incentives might not lose members because those members
might not be able to perceive the reduction in care quality.Since insurance
premiums are easy to compare across plans, other HMOs would have to
react in kind or risk losing members.In this way,competition among plans
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quality of care. Assessing the likelihood of such a race requires a model of
the ways in which managed care organizations compete for members
when care quality is hard to observe.We have constructed such a model of
the HMO marketplace and conclude that a race to the bottom is not the
most likely outcome. As we discuss below, our model has additional
important implications for public policy regarding HMOs.
This brief proceeds in three sections: first, we review some recent economic
literature on physician incentives; second, we present a model of the influ-
ence that market forces have on HMOs’ physician incentive systems; and
finally, we analyze the implications our model has for public policy initia-
tives aimed at preventing an HMO-led race to the bottom in the quality of
medical care.
What Do Physician Incentives Do?
A Brief Tour of the Economics Literature3
A number of recent econometric studies find that physician practice style
is influenced by explicit and implicit financial incentives. Kessler and
McClellan (1996), for example, found that reforms in state malpractice
laws have an economically and statistically significant effect on patient
expenditures for the treatment of heart disease. Specifically, state-level
initiatives that directly reduced plaintiffs’ expected damage awards were
associated with a 5.3 percent reduction in hospital expenditures on acute
myocardial infarctions and a 9.0 percent reduction in hospital expendi-
tures on ischemic heart disease. Since there was virtually no change in
clinical outcomes as a result of these cost reductions, the authors inter-
preted their results as evidence that doctors engage in “defensive”medical
practices,i.e.,the adoption of tests and procedures whose primary ration-
ale is to reduce liability in the event of a malpractice suit.4
While Kessler and McClellan (1996) examined physician responses to
changes in the expected cost of malpractice suits, Barro and Beaulieu
(2000) studied the response of physicians to changes in the compensation
formulas used in their practices.They examined the effect of a switch from
fixed salaries to profit sharing at a set of physician practices owned by a
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pay plan increased profitability significantly, primarily because physicians
increased the number of patients they saw. In addition to changed behav-
ior, Barro and Beaulieu found that the new pay formula altered the com-
position of physician practices—the least productive doctors left the
company, and new entrants proved to be more productive, on average,
than the doctors they replaced.
The common conclusion of these studies is that physician choice of practice
style  does respond to financial incentives.5 It is reasonable to ask, then,
whether incentives to reduce medical costs have an adverse effect on the
quality of care patients receive. Increases in medical expenditures need not,
of course, be associated with better medical care. For example, a medical
error leading to an otherwise avoidable infection may cause an increase in
medical expenditures, but these additional expenditures obviously are not
the result of high-quality care.Similarly,a new drug that controls high blood
pressure is probably much less expensive than the strokes it helps to avert.
These exceptions should not, however, obscure the fact that the general
trend has been for the cost and quality of medical care to increase over time.6
If a higher quality of medical care requires, on average, more money, and
if physicians are responsive to financial incentives, we would expect the
cost-containment incentives that characterize managed care to degrade
medical outcomes. Analyzing the effect of managed care on clinical out-
comes is difficult because the healthiest individuals are most likely to opt
for managed care insurance with the lowest premiums.Nevertheless,care-
ful studies directly examining the issue generally find that managed care
has no influence on clinical outcomes. In a recent study of heart disease,
Cutler,McClellan,and Newhouse (2000) compared the treatment received
by HMO members with that received by those insured under traditional
indemnity plans. They found that although HMOs have 30 to 40 percent
lower expenditures than traditional plans, the actual treatment and health
outcomes differed little across types of plans.
Similar results were found in a study of cost and treatment patterns for
state and local government employees in Massachusetts (Altman, Cutler,
and Zeckhauser 2000). For the 215,000 individuals under 65 years of
age who were included in this study, the authors found that average
HMO medical costs were 40 percent lower than those of an indemnity
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this result on the basis of the sorting described above—healthier people
choose HMOs because they prefer the lower premium rates made possi-
ble by incentive contracts. Focusing on a set of eight specific conditions,
the study reported that roughly half of the HMO cost savings were due
to the lower incidence of these diseases in the HMO population (Altman et
al. 2000). Virtually all of the remaining savings were explained by the fact
that HMOs paid lower prices for the same treatment than indemnity insur-
ers. On the basis of this evidence, HMOs deliver lower costs not by curbing
the use of expensive treatments but by attracting healthier patients and 
paying physicians less per procedure.
The results discussed above lead to a paradoxical conclusion: physician
practice styles do respond to financial incentives,but there is little evidence
that HMO cost-containment incentives cause a discernable reduction in
care quality,at least for such serious and costly conditions as heart disease,
cancer, and diabetes.
Learning about the Paradox of HMO Incentives from the Inside Out7
Most of the empirical literature on physician incentives and managed care
organizations treats physician incentive systems as a black box whose
internal operation is obscured from view. A recent case study by Gaynor,
Rebitzer, and Taylor (2001), however, took a close look at the physician
incentive system in one particular HMO, with results that shed some light
on incentive systems in managed care organizations and the paradox of
managed care incentives.
The HMO under study did not employ the physicians in its network.
Rather, it followed the increasingly common strategy of building its net-
work of doctors through contractual arrangements. Each of the contracts
the HMO wrote with the roughly one thousand primary care physicians in
its network had incentive provisions. During the period of study (1994 to
1997), the HMO used the common “gatekeeper”model, in which primary
care physicians were held responsible for the medical utilization costs
incurred by their patients. If these primary care gatekeepers kept costs
below actuarially determined target levels, they received a sizeable
bonus—roughly 20 percent of their fees.Common physician strategies for
reducing utilization costs included discouraging specialty referrals and
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extended office hours and sophisticated answering services, and teaching
patients to better manage chronic diseases such as asthma and diabetes.
A surprising feature of the HMO’s incentive system was that it contained
a “stop-loss” provision. Under this provision, no patient could “cost” the
physician more than $15,000 per year. Thus, a seriously ill patient who
incurred medical expenses of $100,000 in a year would add only $15,000
to a physician’s annual utilization costs.Although the details of the HMO’s
incentive contracts were complex, and incentive intensity varied over time
and across individual physicians, the authors found that the incentive sys-
tem provided physicians with substantial rewards for reducing costs and,
critically, led to lower costs overall. A typical physician in the network
gained $0.10 in income for every $1.00 reduction in medical utilization
costs. This incentive resulted in a 5 percent reduction in utilization costs,
relative to no cost-cutting incentives at all.Consistent with the HMO’s stop-
loss provision,financial incentives had little or no effect on in-hospital costs.
Rather, the cost reduction was concentrated in outpatient procedures and
referrals to non-primary care physicians. The HMO’s stop-loss provision
appeared to be effective in reducing incentives to cut costs for the most seri-
ously ill patients, i.e., those in the hospital.
In 1997 the HMO introduced an additional patient-protection feature
into the incentive system—payouts to physicians who met both cost and
quality targets. The quality targets consisted of specialty-specific preven-
tive care measures (e.g., for pediatricians the proportion of children
immunized and for gynecologists the proportion of patients receiving
mammograms) and other measures such as patient satisfaction, office
inspections,and patient turnover.Analysis of the “quality”incentives sug-
gested that physicians responded to financial incentives linked to quality
measures just as they did to incentives linked to cost-containment meas-
ures. Indeed, physician groups who were best at keeping costs below 
“target” levels were also best at hitting their quality targets.8
Lessons from this case study help explain the paradox of HMO incentives.
Offering physicians a financial incentive to reduce costs appears to lead to
a reduction in costs. However, these reductions are not distributed evenly
across different types of patients. The reductions occurred primarily in
outpatient charges and specialty referrals, while in-hospital costs were
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contracts offered by the HMO, which were designed to reduce incentive
pressures on physicians treating the most vulnerable patients.
This second lesson raises an important economic question: in the environ-
ment of rising health care costs in which this HMO was competing for new
members, why did it write incentive contracts that so dramatically limited
cost-cutting incentives for the most costly patients? A plausible answer is
that at the same time this HMO was cutting prices to build market share, it
was also trying to position itself as the high-quality care provider in the mar-
ket. Stop-loss provisions were a way to assure high-quality care and still
apply cost-containment pressures on elective medical services. This expla-
nation may be correct, but it is also incomplete. Physician incentive con-
tracts were not advertised,and even if these contracts had become common
knowledge, they were so complex that only the most sophisticated buyers
would have been able to understand the significance of the stop-loss provi-
sions. In addition, the general impression at the HMO was that purchasers
were much more responsive to premium levels and the number of physi-
cians in its network than to assertions regarding quality. If the HMO was
marketing itself as a high-quality provider and paying customers did not
perceive quality (or the quality-preserving contractual provisions),to whom
was it sending the message about quality? 
Quality Competition When Customers 
Do Not Perceive Quality
The previous section summarized the key empirical findings concerning
physician incentives: physicians are responsive to financial incentives, but
incentives in managed care organizations do not lead to measurable degra-
dation in clinical outcomes. One explanation for these paradoxical results
is that HMOs are competing for customers on the basis of both care qual-
ity and cost.Consumers’willingness to pay for quality care limits the prof-
itability of draconian incentive contracts,which induces firms to write less
powerful cost-control incentives into their physician contracts.
A quality-based competitive strategy would be consistent with the HMO
contracts reported in Gaynor, Rebitzer, and Taylor (2001), but it is hard to
see how this strategy could work, given the pervasive information asym-
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ity of most aspects of clinical care, but also information about their physi-
cians’complex incentive contracts. Indeed, managers of the HMO studied
in Gaynor et. al did not expect consumers (patients and employers) to be
as responsive to care quality as to other features of the plan that are easier
to track, such as premium costs and the breadth of the physician network.
In our view, it is the physician’s perception of quality, not the consumer’s,
that matters in the HMO market. The physician perspective is key because
managed care organizations must persuade physicians to join their net-
works.A larger network of physicians makes an HMO much more attractive
to consumers. Network size increases the likelihood that patients will find
physicians in a desirable location or with a congenial interpersonal style. If,
for some reason,patients become dissatisfied with their physician,large net-
works also help assure them that they will find another suitable doctor. For
these reasons, customers are willing to pay more for managed care organi-
zations that offer a wider choice of physicians.
Quality competition is naturally important in attracting physicians to an
HMO network. Physicians, after all, have the clinical knowledge and
patient information required to understand the quality of care they pro-
vide, and they also have an intimate understanding of the terms of the
incentive contracts they sign with insurers. Thus, the previously described
stop-loss provisions have a clear and precise meaning to physicians, if not
to most purchasers of health insurance.9
A Game Theoretic Model of Quality Competition
In a recent Levy Institute Working Paper (Cooper and Rebitzer 2002), we
used a game theoretic model to examine the implications of quality-based
competition for physicians on the kinds of incentive contracts written by
HMOs. This model, like most economic models, rests on certain assump-
tions about the behavior of key actors—here, physicians and consumers.
Physician Behavior
Our analysis rests on the assumption that physicians are influenced by
norms of medical practice,i.e.,doctors dislike and resist financially induced
adjustments to their practice style. This aversion to more cost-conscious
medicine may be the result of moral or ethical commitments to provide 
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influences such as the fear of malpractice suits.We demonstrate that what-
ever their ultimate cause, norms of medical practice can have a profound
effect on the ways in which HMOs compete for patients and doctors.
Our model assumes that two types of norms drive physicians’clinical deci-
sion making: the absolute and the relative level of patient care. Absolute
norms determine the minimal level of patient care that physicians find
acceptable. Physicians, we argue, will not join a network whose incentive
contracts would induce them to violate their absolute practice norms.The
minimally acceptable level of patient care varies from physician to physi-
cian, and is determined by factors that lie outside of the influence of an
HMO, such as the state of medical technology. Whatever the factors’
source, if an HMO wishes to attract physicians to its network, it cannot
write an incentive contract that would lead them to violate their absolute
practice norms.
In contrast to absolute practice norms,relative practice norms involve com-
parisons between the level of care that doctors deliver to their patients and
the level of care received by other patients with similar medical conditions.
These care comparisons make it difficult for physicians to adopt less expen-
sive practice styles for patients who have less generous insurance. Similarly,
relative practice norms make physicians uncomfortable with delivering
low-cost care when other providers deliver high-cost care. From the view-
point of patients, there is little difference between absolute and relative
practice norms; both serve to protect patients from some of the adverse
consequences of cost-containment incentives. From an economic perspec-
t i v e ,h o w ev e r ,d o ct o r s ’concerns about relative and absolute practice norms
differ fundamentally because relative norms are shaped by the actions of all
the HMOs competing in the market.
To see the difference between absolute and relative practice norms, imagine
that you are a physician deciding whether to offer test A to a patient.Imagine
further that test B is a newer,more expensive,and perhaps more effective test
than A.10 Relative practice norms imply that you would feel better about
using A in a market in which everyone else used A than in a market where
everyone else used B, the more expensive test. If the local market is domi-
nated by HMO networks with high-powered cost-containment incentives,
then relative norms would make it easy for you to join a network with an
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the market is dominated by HMO networks that exert little incentive pres-
sure to contain costs, then joining a network whose incentives discourage
you from using B would be difficult.
Norms of any sort are enormously difficult to study directly. In the case of
medical practice norms,however,there is an abundance of indirect evidence
that norms of appropriate care shape physician attitudes and behavior.
For example, a recent survey of physician attitudes published in the New
England Journal of Medicineconcluded that,“...bonuses based on limitation
of referrals and on productivity heighten physicians’‘performance anxiety’
and their perceptions that care may be compromised in these areas”
(Grumbach, et al. 1998; p. 1520). The same study also reported that when
physicians perceived pressure to limit referrals or improve productivity in
ways that compromised care, their satisfaction with their practice declined.
Much of the evidence for the relationship between practice norms and
physicians’ clinical actions comes from location-based differences in the
style of medical care.11 These “small area variations” in practice style are
something of a mystery because they are not accounted for by variations
in underlying clinical conditions, cost of treatment, or patient incomes.
Some analysts have suggested that these geographic practice patterns are
the result of physicians learning by observing the practice style and clini-
cal decisions of other physicians in the vicinity (Phelps 1992). If so, then
practice norms may be at least partially an endogenous result of the 
contracts that prevail elsewhere in the local market.
Consumer Behavior
To complete our model, we now turn attention from physician behavior to
consumer behavior. Plan members (or the employers who purchase plans
for their employees) have preferences about the cost of insurance and the
size of the organization’s physician network.All else being equal,consumers
would, of course, prefer a cheaper insurance policy to a more expensive
one. All else is rarely equal among competing plans, however, and some
consumers would be willing to pay additional money for access to larger
physician networks, where they are more likely to find a doctor they like.
Indeed it is commonplace for HMOs to offer members access to a broader
network of physicians (or even dispense with the network altogether) in
exchange for higher premium payments. No doubt some consumers are
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desirable physician match,while others consider all physicians more or less
alike.12 This heterogeneity of consumers can lead to market segmentation,
with some plans assembling large networks of physicians and charging high
prices while others do not.
The Effect of Physician Practice Norms on HMO Networks
Given that practice norms cause physicians to dislike working under high-
powered cost-containment incentives, an HMO would want to impose
incentives strong enough to have a substantial effect on costs, but not so
strong that it could not assemble its desired physician network. If physi-
cians differ in how averse they are to medical cost-containment measures,
i.e., if physicians differ in their absolute practice norms, then attracting
large numbers of physicians to a particular network would require an
HMO to write low-powered incentive contracts. Incentives that are toler-
able to some physicians may not be tolerable to more incentive-averse
physicians.
Thus, when HMOs try to differentiate themselves by the size of their
physician networks, they end up engaging in something closely akin to
quality-based competition. Customers who place a relatively high value
on physician choice and a relatively low value on the cost of insurance 
will choose HMOs with large networks and low-powered incentives.
Conversely, customers who place a high value on low-cost insurance will
choose HMOs with small physician networks and high-powered incen-
tives. Notice that quality-based product differentiation occurs not
because consumers perceive and demand quality, but because physicians
operate under the influence of powerful norms.
While physician practice norms introduce quality competition into the
HMO marketplace, it is not obvious that such norms always support high-
quality care. We might expect, for example, that relative practice norms
would lead to an increase in physician incentive intensity throughout the
market. After all, one HMO imposing high-powered incentives in the mar-
ket makes it easier for all other HMOs to do the same. We find, however,
that physicians’ relative practice norms have the opposite effect. To under-
stand this, remember that under relative practice norms physicians do not
like to operate with less generous practice styles than others in their market.
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HMOs to relax incentives in order to assemble a network of sufficient size to
attract customers.These changes will increase the costs of operation for low-
cost HMOs, which will, in turn, try to attract customers who are less price
sensitive by building larger networks and charging higher prices.The higher-
priced HMOs that dominate the upper end of the market will respond to
this incursion by moving farther “upmarket”themselves.When the dust set-
tles,the result is that increased strength of relative physician norms forces all
HMOs in the market to operate with lower-powered incentives.This reduc-
tion in incentive intensity is most pronounced for HMOs that target the
low-cost end of the HMO market.
Implications of Quality Competition among HMOs13
If patients cannot assess care quality,and if,as the economic evidence sug-
gests, physicians respond to incentives, what prevents HMOs from engag-
ing in a “race to the bottom”in which draconian incentive contracts drive
care quality to minimally acceptable levels? 
The answer is that HMOs are constrained by their need to build large net-
works of physicians. In this competition, the key factors are physician
practice norms and the willingness of consumers to pay for large networks
to ensure adequate physician choice. In our model, some HMOs target
consumers with a high willingness to pay for physician choice by offering
very large physician networks characterized by weak cost-containment
incentives. Other HMOs, however, target price-sensitive customers by
operating relatively small networks and offering substantial financial
rewards to physicians practicing low-cost medicine.
From a policy perspective,there might be a legitimate concern that low-cost
HMOs would drive medical care quality close to the “bottom”for the most
cost-conscious consumers. The likelihood of this outcome depends on the
importance of relative practice norms. If physicians are sufficiently con-
cerned with relative levels of care, low-cost HMOs would have great diffi-
culty in introducing incentives that radically degrade care. Indeed, if
relative practice norms were sufficiently powerful motivators for physi-
cians, then a “race to the bottom” would be less of a problem than a “race
to the top”in which HMOs in all segments of the market employ only weak
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The recent shift away from the “gatekeeper” model by United Healthcare
and other large HMOs may reflect this competitive dynamic (Weber 2002;
Cowley 1999).
A “race to the top” may appear to be good news for consumers and bad
news for insurance companies, but the situation is not that simple. If low-
cost HMOs find it increasingly difficult to differentiate themselves from
their high-cost,big-network rivals,insurance costs will rise throughout the
market.As a result, some patients will be priced out of the insurance mar-
ket and opt for no health insurance coverage at all.These newly uninsured
individuals, a group that will tend to include younger and lower-income
workers, are clearly made worse off by the rise in insurance premiums.
Employees at the other end of the spectrum, i.e., those who are willing to
pay a lot of money for large networks and a high degree of physician
choice, are likely to be made better off by a “race to the top.” The impact
for workers in the middle is ambiguous: while some are made better off by
the availability of larger networks, many will experience a welfare decline
because of increased insurance premiums.
Implications for Public Policy 
Concern over the adverse consequences of managed care has grown with the
increasing importance of HMOs in the U.S.health care system.Although the
managed care industry has always been subject to regulation at the federal
and state levels (Robinson 1999), interest is growing in public policy that
more directly influences HMO incentive systems (Gosfield 1997).
Two broad regulatory strategies for shaping physician incentives have
received most of the public attention in this area: (1) imposing caps on the
proportion of “at-risk” income allowed in physician contracts; and (2)
making HMOs legally liable for the adverse medical consequences attrib-
uted to their cost-containment systems.
The first strategy is embodied in Physician Incentive Plan (PIP) regulations
implemented in 1997 by the Health Care Financing Administration
(Gosfield 1997).These regulations require that incentive contracts not place
more than 25 percent of physician income “at risk,” i.e., no more than 25
percent of a physician’s income can be linked to performance objectives.14
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Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) to make HMOs liable for
damages linked to their cost-containment systems (Havighurst 2000).15
Some of the changes proposed for ERISA in recent years have been included
in various proposals for “Patients’Bill of Rights”or “Patient Protection Act”
legislation (Pear 2002; Studdert, Sage, Gresenz, and Hensler 1999).16
In a setting in which HMOs compete by price and network size,the effects
of capping physicians’ at-risk income are analogous to the “race-to-the-
top” phenomenon discussed above. The low-cost managed care organiza-
tions must reduce the intensity of their physician incentive contracts.
Having lost their ability to contain costs, these HMOs would move
“upmarket” by increasing their premiums and the size of their physician
networks. Companies in the upscale segment of the market would then
protect their customer niche by taking similar actions. As a result, premi-
ums would rise everywhere and the number of uninsured would increase.
These newly uninsured would be made worse off by this change. Other
consumers, however, would be made better off because they are happy to
pay higher premiums in order to enjoy the benefits of larger HMO net-
works.Still others would remain insured but may be made worse off by the
increase in prices.
Understanding the impact of increasing HMO liability for malpractice is a
bit more complex. Strictly speaking, making HMOs liable should have no
effect at all on the HMO market. Physicians, after all, are heavily insured
against malpractice suits,and the cost of this insurance is already included
in the compensation that HMOs must pay to attract physicians to their
networks. Recent studies of jury behavior, however, suggest that large
organizations with “deep pockets” are typically hit with higher punitive
damage awards than smaller organizations (Kahneman, Schkade, and
Sunstein 1998). These results suggest that making large organizations like
HMOs defendants in malpractice suits will increase the size of jury awards.
If this is so, then changing ERISA will have the same effect as increasing
physicians’relative practice norms.HMOs whose management and incen-
tive practices pressured physicians to provide relatively lower-cost care will
risk higher malpractice costs. As a result, low-cost HMOs will come to
resemble their higher-cost counterparts, and premiums will rise through-
out the marketplace. This rise in costs will have the now familiar effect of
increasing the number of uninsured.
Medical Practice Norms and the Quality of Care
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 21Is Intervention a Bad Idea? 
We have argued that public policies limiting cost-containment incentives
have the twin effects of increasing premiums and the number of unin-
sured. Given that the number of uninsured workers has been rising
(Gruber and McKnight 2002), can we conclude that regulating physician
incentive systems and, therefore, exacerbating this problem is necessarily
bad policy? Our answer is no.
There are important externalities to health care that may not be fully cap-
tured in the factors that constrain HMO behavior: physician practice
norms, customer preferences for physician choice, and expected awards
for malpractice. Some of these externalities involve health outcomes–if
more expensive treatments are also more effective, then financing these
treatments may also improve the welfare of caregivers and family mem-
bers who are not directly involved in the purchase of health care insur-
ance. Other externalities involve the physician-patient relationship–the
possibility of high-powered financial incentives anywhere in the health
system can undermine a patient’s willingness to listen to and trust in a
doctor’s advice.17 If the net social value of more expensive practice styles
or restrictions on contracting exceeds their private value, a strong case
remains for interventions that limit the ways HMOs regulate care.
The lesson of our analysis is not that policy interventions are necessarily a
bad idea, but, rather, that they must be undertaken with an understanding
of their cost, especially when they result in an increase in premiums and a
potential increase in the number of uninsured.Policies that regulate HMO
incentive systems can be made more effective and palatable if they are
implemented in conjunction with policies that increase access to care for
the uninsured.
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In most economic settings, incentive systems are either ineffective or
they work and you “get what you pay for.” Evidence suggests that physi-
cians are not immune to financial incentives. Are patients getting what
they pay for, or will the profound information asymmetries in medicine
lead to a race to the bottom in care quality?  
Our research has shown that under certain conditions,a race to the bottom
need not occur.These conditions—that physicians have strong norms con-
cerning the minimal quality of care they deliver, and that patients like the
options offered by larger HMO networks—are broadly consistent with the
realities of today’s managed care environment. Our model results are also
consistent with the absence to date of strong evidence that care quality is
lower for HMO patients.
If competition among managed care organizations takes the form we pro-
pose in this brief, then public policy regarding HMOs and their physician
incentive systems needs to be carefully thought through. Intervention
aimed at muting physician incentives would have the effect of increasing
costs and reducing access to health care. Therefore, regulations and laws
targeting the incentive systems of managed care organizations should also
include mechanisms for improving access to health care.
Finally, our analysis of physician incentives and competition in the HMO
marketplace rests critically on the norms of medical practice that prevail
among physicians.Refining our understanding of public policy in this area
would require a corresponding refinement in our understanding of the
way norms shape both physician behavior and the functioning of markets.
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1. This Nick Davies cartoon was in the July 19, 1999, issue of The New
Yorker.
2. Today’s health care marketplace has an “alphabet soup” of acronyms
that describe some variation on the theme of the HMO. To keep the
discussion simple, we refer only to HMOs and managed care organi-
zations and use the terms interchangeably.
3. The review of the literature is drawn from “Managed Care, Physician
Incentives, and Norms of Medical Practice: Racing to the Bottom or
Pulling to the Top?”by Cooper and Rebitzer (2002).
4. The outcome measures included one-year mortality rates and read-
mission rates for either acute myocardial infarction or heart failure.
5. Robinson (2001) reaches similar conclusions in his review of the med-
ical literature.
6. Indeed, if the quality of medical care were not positively correlated
with its cost, the issue of physician cost-control incentives would not
be controversial at all.
7. The material in this section is drawn from Gaynor,Rebitzer,and Taylor
(2001) and from a summary published in the February 2002 issue of
the National Bureau of Economic Research Digest (Certo 2002).
8. This finding does not necessarily mean that low-cost physicians pro-
vided higher-quality care. The quality measures used by the HMO,
while standard in the industry, were relatively simple indicators of
preventative care and patient satisfaction. Improvements in these
measures need not have precluded declines along other, nonmea-
sured, aspects of quality.
9. One might object here that patients,if provided the information,would
also make choices based on the physician incentive plans in their HMO.
Pressure is growing on managed care organizations to describe physi-
cian incentive systems to their members,but there is little evidence that
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Dugan 2000; and Miller and Horowitz 2000).
10. In this mental exercise, we assume that the medical literature is unde-
cided on the superiority of B to A.
11. For an excellent discussion of this large literature, see Phelps (1992).
12. Our assumption that HMO members cannot observe the quality of
clinical care does not imply that patients are indifferent to the identity
of their doctor.Many will have preferences about the nonclinical char-
acteristics of individual physicians, e.g., location, age, gender, or com-
munication style. Indeed, a large billboard in Cleveland announces
that members of Kaiser Permanente, a large HMO, may switch
providers any time. Clearly, the purchasers of this advertisement
believe that enabling patient choice of physicians is something of
value to potential HMO members.
13. The issues raised in this section are presented in detail in Cooper and
Rebitzer (2002).
14. Gaynor, Rebitzer, and Taylor (2001) document a case in which these
regulations substantially weakened an HMO’s incentive contracts.
They also present some evidence that these weaker contracts increased
the HMO’s medical utilization costs.
15. ERISA offers limited regulatory control over and remedies for health
plans.
16. A third regulatory strategy would require HMOs to reveal the details
of their physician incentive contracts to patients. Meaningful patient
disclosure is limited by the complexity of incentive plans (Gaynor,
Rebitzer,and Taylor 2001) and the limited ability of patients to under-
stand even basic information about incentives (Hall, Kid, and Dugan
2000; Miller and Horowitz 2000).
17. Miller and Horowitz (2000) review the evidence relating to consumer
knowledge of physician incentives and patient trust in physicians.
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